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Abstract 
If emissions are stochastic and firms are unable to control them through abatement, the 
cap in a permit market may be exceeded, or not be reached.  I derive a binary options pricing 
formula that expresses the permit price as a function of the penalty for noncompliance and the 
probability of an exceeded cap under the assumption of no abatement.  I apply my model to the 
EU ETS, where the rapid introduction of the market made it difficult for firms to adjust their 
production technology in time for phase 1.  The model fits the data well, implying that the 
permit price was at least partly driven by firms hedging against stochastic emissions.   
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1.  Introduction 
The centerpiece of emissions permit market theory is that firms equate their marginal 
abatement costs with the permit price.  If a firm finds abating an additional unit of emissions to 
be cheaper than buying a permit, it will make a profit from abating and either buy one fewer or 
sell one more permit on the market.  Conversely, if purchasing a permit is cheaper than 
marginal abatement, the firm will use the permit market to reach compliance.  The result of this 
arbitrage is that marginal abatement costs of all firms are equal to the permit price at every 
point in time.   
However, a permit market may not clear if emissions are stochastic and there are 
constraints on abatement, banking and borrowing.  The natural lower bound for abatement is 
zero: No firm is forced to actively increase its emissions in order to use up any surplus permits.  
Therefore, if business-as-usual (BAU) emissions turn out to be below the cap and no banking 
into the next compliance period is allowed, some permits will not be used.  Any upper bound 
on the permit price, for example in the form of a penalty for noncompliance,  translates to an 
upper bound for abatement:  If BAU emissions turn out to be greater than expected (for 
example due increased consumer demand) and no borrowing from the next compliance period 
is allowed, firms abate to the extent where their marginal abatement costs are equal to the 
penalty.  The emissions cap will be exceeded because firms that do not hold enough permits to 
cover their emissions will choose to pay the penalty rather than engage in abatement.   
In theory, firms can always reduce emissions by cutting output, but this may be costlier 
than paying the penalty.  Some industries face obligations to provide a certain level of output.  
An example is the electricity market where supply has to match (stochastic) consumer demand 
at all times in order for the grid not to crash, and the transmission system operator has the 
authority to force particular generators on- or offline to ensure continued grid functionality.   
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The price path of emission permits during the 2005-2007 period of European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) has puzzled market participants and economists alike 
(Figure 1).  The price was above €20 for close to 16 months and even surpassed €30 before 
plummeting to about half of this value after the first round of emissions accounting in April 
2006 revealed that 2005 emissions were below the number of permits issued for that year.  
Rather than dropping to zero immediately, the permit price remained at around €15 for another 
four months before gradually decreasing to zero by mid 2007.  The market did in fact not clear 
for the first compliance phase, with 189 million permits or about 2.7 % of the overall cap 
expiring unused at the end of 2007 (no banking of permits into the second phase was allowed) 
despite a positive permit price during most of the time (Table 1).   
Figure 1: Allowance price and trading volume during phase 1 of the EU ETS 
 
A series of recent studies empirically analyze the first phase of the EU ETS under the 
assumption of a clearing permit market and continuous equality between the permit price and 
firms’ marginal abatement costs (Alberola et al., 2008; Bunn and Fezzi, 2008; Hintermann, 
2010; Mansanet-Bataller et al., 2007; Rickels et al., 2007).  They find limited evidence that the 
permit price was driven by marginal abatement costs such as fuel prices, economic activity or 
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the weather.  One possible reason may be that emissions are stochastic, coupled with 
constraints on abatement.  The EU ETS was set up very rapidly, with little more than a year 
between the initial legislation and the start of the market in January 2005.  Because permit 
banking was not allowed during the first three, only abatement that physically took place by the 
end of 2007 could affect the first-phase permit price.  Considering that planning and installation 
of new production equipment often takes longer than a few years, most analysts concluded that 
fuel switching in the power sector (a shift of the generation merit order from coal towards gas) 
was going to be the predominant method of abatement for phase 1.  On the other hand, 
electricity generators are typically locked into long-term fuel contracts,1 which makes it 
difficult to engage in fuel switching on a meaningful level.   
Table 1: Summary of phase 1 of the EU ETS (Mt=million tons) 
  2005 2006 2007 Total phase 1 
     
Price (OTC, time average) € 18.40 € 18.05 € 0.72 € 12.39 
Trading volumea 262 Mt 817 Mt 1,364 Mt 2,443 Mt 
Allocation (source: CITL) 2,099 Mt 2,072 Mt 2,079 Mt 6,250 Mt 
Emissions (source: CITL) 2,010 Mt 2,031 Mt 2,041 Mt 6,081 Mt 
Surplus (volume) 89 Mt 41 Mt 39 Mt 168 Mt 
Surplus (%) 4.22 % 1.98 % 1.85 % 2.69 % 
  a: OTC and exchange trading for phases 1 and 2, but excluding bilateral trades (source: Point Carbon) 
 
In this paper set up a model in which firms are unable to control their emissions and buy 
permits in order to hedge against the possibility of having to pay a penalty.  The permit price 
thus becomes a binary option that is a function of the probability that the emissions cap is 
exceeded and the penalty for noncompliance, but not of marginal abatement costs.  I compute 
daily emissions based on daily generation of electricity from fossil fuels and use market data 
from the first phase of the EU ETS to estimate a set of free parameters.  The parameter 
                                                                
1 These fuel contracts are often made for gate delivery in the form of take-or-pay, which makes it almost impossible to re-sell 
the fuel on the market.  Because of limited storage capacity, generators are forced to use this fuel by bidding above (current) 
marginal costs.   
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estimates are highly significant and make economic sense, and the model fits the data well, 
especially when allowing for an updating of expectations at the time of the permit price crash.   
Previous papers have addressed the issue of stochastic emissions and constraints on 
abatement (Chesney and Taschini, 2008).  However, the stochastic equilibrium models derived 
in these studies are too complex to be directly applied to data.  The main contribution of my 
paper is therefore empirical.  To my knowledge, it is the first to account for the possibility of a 
non-clearing permit market while allowing for a direct application of the model to market data.  
In addition, I make use of an extremely detailed dataset about electricity consumption and 
precipitation across Europe that has not been employed in the empirical literature before.   
My model represents a polar case where abatement is constrained to zero and the market 
is only influenced by expectations about aggregate stochastic emissions and the penalty of 
noncompliance.  The other extreme of the spectrum is defined by the textbook situation where 
firms have full control over their emissions, and therefore the permit price is exclusively driven 
by marginal abatement costs.  For phase 1 of the EU ETS, the reality is likely to be found 
somewhere in between: Some abatement probably took place (Ellerman and Buchner, 2008), 
but the empirical evidence suggests that the permit price was not strongly related to marginal 
abatement costs.  In fact, I find that a large portion of the permit price variation during phase 1 
of the EU ETS can be explained without relying on abatement cost drivers at all.  This has 
implications for efficiency, because the equality between marginal abatement costs and the 
permit price are a prerequisite for achieving an emissions cap at least cost.   
Section 2 gives some background about the EU ETS and the relevant literature.  In 
Section 3 I derive an options pricing formula for EU ETS allowances as a function of 
emissions, the cap, the penalty for noncompliance and a set of free parameters.  This formula 
contains the mean and variance of expected future emissions, which I derive in Section 4 as a 
function of exogenous stochastic processes.  Section 5 presents regression results for the 
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parameters of underlying processes and the free parameters in the options pricing formula, and 
section 6 concludes.   
 
2. Background 
2.1  The European Union Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) 
The EU ETS is the world’s largest emissions permit market to date and covers the EU’s 
carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions from six industrial sectors (Figure 2), among which power & 
heat accounts for about 72% of total emissions.2   
Figure 2: Emissions by sector (Source: CITL, 2006 data) 
 
The EU ETS is organized into distinct multiyear periods called “phases” that are subject 
to different rules and emission caps.  The first phase spanned the years 2005-2007 and was 
considered a pilot run for phase 2, which coincides with the Kyoto compliance period of 2008-
                                                                
2 The Community Independent Transaction Log (CITL) of the European Commission lists 9 sectors defined by “activity code”, 
which are: Code 1: Combustion installations with thermal output of >20MW; 2: Mineral oil refineries; 3: Coke ovens; 4: Metal 
ore roasting or sintering; 5: Production of pig iron and steel; 6: Cement and lime; 7: Glass; 8: Ceramics; 9: Pulp and paper.  For 
the grouping in figure 2, I aggregated codes 3-5 into “metals” and 7-8 into “glass and ceramics”.  For the other sectors, there is 
a one-to-one correspondence with activity codes.  Within activity code 1, commercial power and heat producers for third parties 
account for 93% of emissions, whereas the remaining 7% come from numerous but relatively small installations involved in the 
production of on-site power and heat (so-called “autoproducers”).   
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2012.  First-phase allowances (one-time rights to emit one ton of CO2, denoted as EUA) could 
not be banked into the second phase and lost their value if unused for compliance.3  About 
12,000 individual installations received a total of 2.1 billion emission allowances annually, 
mostly at no cost. For a more detailed discussion of the market setup, see Kruger and Pizer 
(2004) and the PEW White Paper (2005).   
Firms received allowances allocated mostly for, based on estimates of historic emissions.  
Firms can trade allowances freely within the EU, either bilaterally, through brokers (over-the-
counter or OTC trades) or on one of six exchanges.  By April 30, they have to report their 
emissions and surrender permits corresponding to their emissions in the previous calendar year.  
For every ton of emitted CO2 for which they do not surrender an allowance, firms have to pay a 
penalty (€40 in phase 1 and €100 in phase 2) as well as surrender the missing allowance in the 
following year.  Because firms receive annual allowances in March they can effectively bank 
and borrow across time within a market phase, which implies that the penalty of noncompliance 
will only be applied at the end of a phase.  Since allowance allocation exceeded emissions for 
phase 1, the penalty has not been applied to date.   
Because of the lack of historic emissions data in Europe, many countries relied on firms’ 
emissions forecasts when determining permit allocation, which introduced rather obvious 
incentive problems.  There seems to be a general agreement among analysts that the first round 
of emissions accounting in April 2006 revealed lower-than-expected emissions, indicating that 
the cap was more generous than previously believed.  The downward adjustment of market 
participants’ expectations about aggregate emissions for phase 1 caused the allowance price to 
lose half of its value within a day.  What is less evident than the reasons for the crash is why the 
                                                                
3 Banking is allowed between the second and later phases.   
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price was so high in the first place,4 and why it did not crash to zero but remained in a range of 
€15 for several months afterwards.   
Another feature of the EU ETS that may be important in the context of this paper is the 
process for second-phase allocation, which took first-phase emissions into account.  The 
European Commission urged member countries not to engage in such “allocation updating”, 
but most of them based their national allocation plans for phase 2 on verified 2005 emissions 
anyway.5  Basing future allocation on current emissions creates a strong disincentive to abate, 
because every unit of abatement comes at a cost not only in the current period but also causes a 
reduction in future free allocation (Boehringer and Lange, 2005).  As a result, it is possible or 
even likely that firms stuck to their existing fuel contracts and merit order even if they had been 
able to engage in fuel switching (or any other form of abatement).   
2.2  Literature  
There is a large theoretical literature in environmental economics about permit trading, 
starting with the seminal work of Montgomery (1972) and Tietenberg (1985).  Later 
contributions extended the analysis to incorporate banking and borrowing of permits 
(Cronshaw and Brown-Kruse, 1996; Leiby and Rubin, 2001; Rubin, 1996) and to address 
uncertainty (Newell et al., 2005; Schennach, 2000; Zhao, 2003).  All of these studies show that 
it is optimal from a social and a firm perspective to equate marginal abatement costs to the 
permit price, and that this will lead to the achievement of an emissions reduction target at least 
cost.   
                                                                
4 If all firms with an allowance surplus brought them to the market, the price would incorporate information about aggregate 
BAU emissions and the resulting necessary abatement levels.  The fact that the allowance price was positive during much of the 
first phase, in spite of an over-allocation indicates that the allowance price did not reflect all relevant information.   
5 Although obviously problematic from a permit market point of, one has to consider the fact that most EU member countries 
had very little information about CO2 emissions.  Given a grandfathering allocation method, it was very difficult for most 
countries to completely disregard the new information gained during the first year of the market.   
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Empirical studies about price determination in the EU ETS are inconclusive about 
whether observed allowance prices are indeed determined by marginal abatement costs.  In one 
of the first empirical analyses of the market, Mansanet-Bataller et al. (2007) regress allowance 
price changes on changes in fuel prices and extreme weather conditions for the first year of the 
market (2005) and find some statistically significant coefficients with the expected sign, but the 
explanatory power of the model was quite weak.  The most significant exogenous variable 
turned out to be the oil price, which is not an abatement-related measure (very little electricity 
is produced using oil in the EU, and neither the transportation nor the residential sectors are 
covered by the market), and the fuel switch price from coal to gas was not significant.  Rickels 
et al. (2007) extend the analysis to 2006 and find some correspondence between allowance 
prices, fuel prices and European weather before the April 2006 price crash, but virtually none 
for the period afterwards.  They also checked for cointegration between allowance and fuel 
prices, which would be evidence of a systematic relationship, but found none.  In contrast, 
Bunn and Fezzi (2008) did find a cointegrating relationship between prices for allowances, gas 
and electricity, but the relationship between gas and allowance prices was weak and possibly 
due to the fact that both prices are related to electricity prices.   
Hintermann (2010) derives a market model that expresses allowance price changes as a 
function of market fundamentals related to the overall cap and abatement by fuel switching and 
estimates the resulting regression using market data through mid 2007.  He finds that before the 
price crash, there was no correlation between abatement-related fundamentals and the 
allowance price.  The results for the period after the April 2006 price crash are somewhat more 
supportive of the idea of fuel switching, but fuel prices explained a minor share of the 
allowance price variation even in the best-matching specification of a large number of 
specifications.   
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Another strand of literature has looked at the issue from a mathematical finance 
perspective, focusing on the dynamics of allowance prices and methods to hedge against 
emissions-related risk.  Kosobud et al. (2005) applied financial tools to the analysis of SO2 
permits in the US Acid Rain program, and Paolella and Taschini (2008) examine the same 
market as well as the EU ETS.  They find that allowance price returns are fat-tailed and thus are 
best modeled using models that take this property into account.  However, they use a pure time 
series approach and do not aim to identify exogenous price drivers.  In a similar approach, Benz 
and Trueck (2009) focus on the properties of short-term allowance price returns, and propose 
the use of Markov-switching models and time-varying volatility measures to describe the 
observed prices.   
Chesney and Taschini (2008) develop a theoretical model that incorporates asymmetric 
information in the sense that firms have more complete information about their own emissions 
than about those of other firms in the market.  Under the assumption that firms were not able to 
abate emissions before the end of 2007, they show that allowances are financial options and 
simulate allowance prices that for some parameter values show a bubble-like price path similar 
to that observed for phase-1 EUAs.   
Seifert et al (2008) derive a stochastic equilibrium permit price model and analyze the 
resulting EUA price dynamics.  They prove that discounted allowance prices are martingales, 
meaning that they do not follow a seasonal pattern but immediately incorporate all relevant 
market information.  The authors argue that the allowance price in their model will never reach 
zero before the end of the period because the stochastic nature of prices, emissions and 
abatement ensures a positive probability that the cap turns out to be binding and the penalty for 
noncompliance has to be paid, a result which also features in my model.   
Carmona et al. (2009) also develop a model in which allowance prices are driven by the 
probability of the cap to be exceeded, the cash part of the penalty for noncompliance (but not 
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the second-phase allowances that also form part of the penalty) and fuel prices.  They conclude 
with a numerical analysis based on a simplified model version where they use market data to 
calibrate emission and fuel price processes, although their setup does not allow them to 
incorporate daily data to update firms’ expectations about future emissions.  They find that their 
proxy for marginal abatement costs, namely the current cost to abate one ton of CO2 by fuel 
switching, is not highly correlated with the allowance price, supporting my assumption about 
the irrelevance of abatement during phase 1 of the EU ETS.  
 
3. Model 
Let tP  be the closing price for an allowance on day t , with the index ),...,2,1( Tt =  
starting on January 1, 2005 and ending on December 31, 2007.  CO2 emissions on day t  are 
represented by tg .  Let ∑ =≡
t
k k
t gG
11
 denote cumulative realized emissions (observed with 
certainty) and ∑ +=≡
T
tk k
T
t gG 1  cumulative future emissions until the end of the market 
(stochastic).  Furthermore, let P  refer to the penalty for noncompliance and 0S  to the total 
emissions cap over the entire market period imposed by the regulator.  Finally, it will be useful 
to define tt GSS 10 −=  to be the “remaining cap” until the end of the market.   
The purchase of an allowance gives the bearer the option to use it for compliance at the 
end of the period or to sell it.  However, if the cap turns out to be not binding, the bearer can 
retire the allowance.  This makes an allowance a financial option, specifically a binary call 
option, also called a cash-or-nothing option, a point also made by Chesney and Taschini (2008).  
At time T  the payoff from holding an allowance is:   
(1) 
00
0
T
T
T
Sif
P
SP if
>
=  ≤
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The penalty of noncompliance P  consists of a cash penalty of €40 plus the cost of buying 
an additional permit for the second phase.  Let IItP represent the price of the December-2008 
forward contract for an allowance at time t.  The penalty at time T can then be written as6 
(2) IITP €40 P= +  
At t T<  it is not known whether the cap will be exceeded, provided that it has not been 
exceeded already.  The expected payoff from holding an allowance at time T  is  
(3) 
[ | 0] [ ] ( )
[ | 0] [ ]
t
T T
t T t t t t t
S
t T t t
E P S E P G dG
E P S E P
ζ
∞
> = ⋅
≤ =
∫  
where )( Ttt Gζ  denotes the probability density function over cumulative future CO2 
emissions TtG  and ][⋅tE  stands for the expectation taken using all information available at time 
t.  The time subscript on the expectation about the penalty results from changing expectations 
about the second-phase price, which is relevant for the non-cash part of the penalty.   
I specify emissions as a linear combination of normally distributed processes (see Section 
4), which means that they are normally distributed as well.  Options pricing formulae are 
usually based on log-normally distributed underlying assets, reflecting the idea that total returns 
are the multiplication of single-period returns.  Cumulative emissions, however, are additive 
rather than multiplicative, and it is therefore appropriate to model them using a normal 
distribution.7  Let tµ  and ts  denote the mean and standard deviation of stochastic cumulative 
                                                                
6 The cash penalty has to be paid after the end of the first phase, whereas the additional permits will have to be surrendered in 
2009 together with permits for the calendar year 2008.  Because permits can be banked and borrowed within a phase, I abstract 
from the difference in timing of the two penalty components.   
7 In theory, the choice of a normal distribution requires a truncation at zero necessary since negative emissions are not defined.  
But because CO2 emissions in the EU are many standard deviations away from zero, the correction implied by the truncation is 
extremely small, such that for the remainder of this paper I will neglect the truncation issue.   
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future emissions TtG .  Its standardized form ( ) /
T
t t t tQ G sµ≡ −  has a standard normal 
distribution by construction.  Let )(⋅ϕ  and )(⋅Φ  be the probability density function and 
cumulative probability density function of the standard normal distribution, respectively.  I now 
convert the integral in (3) into an integral over tQ : 
(4) 
( )
( )/
[ | 0] [ ] ( )
[ ]
t t t
t T t t t t
S s
II t t
t T
t
E P S E P Q dQ
S€40 E P
s
µ
φ
µ
∞
−
> = ⋅
 −
= + ⋅Φ  
 
∫
 
Arbitrage considerations dictate that the price at time t be equal to the expected price at T, 
discounted by the risk-free rate of interest r.8  Due to arbitrage considerations, the expected 
second-phase price at time T has to be the current forward price, scaled by the rate of interest, 
such that ( )[ ]II r T t IIt T tE P e P
−= .  Thus, the discounted expected allowance price at time T is9  
(5) 
( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )
[ | 0] 40
[ | 0] 40
r T t r T t II t t
t T t t
t
r T t r T t II
t T t t
Se E P S e P
s
e E P S e P
µ− − − −
− − − −
 −
> = + ⋅Φ  
 
≤ = +
 
The first parenthesis in (5) is the discounted total penalty for noncompliance per ton of 
uncovered emissions consisting of the cash penalty and a second-phase allowance.  The term 
( )Φ ⋅  represents the probability that the cap is exceeded, which is unity for the second line.   
                                                                
8 Real-world markets are typically not risk-neutral, but option prices based on risk neutrality nevertheless yield the correct 
(meaning no-arbitrage) solution for traded assets (Hull, 2002).  In the case of emissions, the risk may be spanned by electricity 
future contracts, weather options and derivatives based on emissions-related indicators such as temperature in rivers close to 
nuclear power plants (if water temperatures are too high to cool the plants, nuclear generation is switched off, as has happened 
in Sweden in the Summer of 2005).  In any case, the price of market risk can never be determined with a sufficient degree of 
confidence in order to make its inclusion in an empirical pricing formula worthwhile, due to measurement and identification 
issues (e.g. a greater market fundamental and a higher price of risk have the same effect on the price).   
9 For a fully rigorous exposition that leads to the same result, see Chesney and Taschini (2008) and Carmona (2009).  The latter 
also prove that the permit price is indeed a martingale, a property which is assumed but not formally derived here.   
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Equation (5) is a binary options formula for the allowance price, with the underlying asset 
being normally distributed cumulative future emissions.  What remains to be determined in 
order to evaluate (5) are past emissions (to compute tS ) and the mean and standard deviation of 
cumulative future emissions, tµ  and ts .  Daily emissions are not actually observed, but have to 
be derived from underlying processes and ultimately estimated using market data.  This is the 
subject of the following section.   
 
4. Mean and standard deviation of future emissions 
4.1.  Processes underlying CO2 emissions  
There exist no data about daily CO2 emissions, but for the power and heat sector there is 
something that can serve as a substitute: Daily electricity consumption.   
Electricity is special in the sense that demand has to be met with a matching supply at all 
times in order for the grid not to collapse.  I assume that the short-term price elasticity of 
electricity consumption is zero, such that electricity supply is equal to demand, which in turn is 
a function of exogenous processes such as the weather and overall economic activity.10   
Because only generation from fossil fuels contributes to CO2 emissions, I have to adjust 
total consumption by the availability of “clean” (i.e. non-CO2-emitting) sources of electricity, 
mainly hydroelectric and nuclear power.11   
                                                                
10 In the long run, consumers will react to higher electricity prices by changing their consumption habits and appliance 
portfolio, such that electricity demand is also a function of the electricity price.  But regardless of the time horizon and the 
associated energy efficiency of households and industry, exogenous shocks will always drive short-term electricity 
consumption.   
11 Although wind generation has increased rapidly during the past few years, it still accounts for a relatively small fraction of 
total power production.   
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Let 
 
ct  represent overall electricity consumption; 
 
ct
c consumption of conventional fossil-
fueled generation; tn  nuclear power generation (all in Giga-Watt-hours (GWh) per day); and 
 
ht  
rainfall in the EU in millimeters (mm) per day.  Demand for conventional generation is  
(6) ct t t tc c h nη= − −  
where 
 
η is a fixed coefficient translating precipitation into hydroelectric power.12  I 
compute η  by dividing the EU’s total hydro generation in 1990-2005 of 4,852,000 GWh by 
cumulative weighted precipitation over the same period of 9,775 mm, using installed 
hydroelectric capacity per country as weights.  This results in a conversion factor of 
 
η=496.4 
GWh/mm.   
Nuclear generation is “flat”, i.e. power plants are not ramped up and down on a daily or 
even seasonal basis but provide constant output.  In the EU, 12 member countries have nuclear 
power plants.13  Their combined average generation in the years 2003-2005 was 2,679 GWh 
per day, which I will use as a measure for tn n t= ∀ .   
The emission intensity of the marginal generator varies over the dispatch order (the 
sequence according to which generators come online, usually based on least cost).  The correct 
measure for CO2-emissions in Europe’s power & heat sector is  
(7) 
0
( )
c
tc
t tg y dy= Ψ∫  
                                                                
12 Since precipitation can be stored to some extent, either in reservoirs or as snow in the mountains, there is no immediate 
relationship between precipitation and hydro generation on any given day.  On the long run, however, all hydro generation is 
ultimately due to precipitation, and even if rainfall today may not translate into more generation today, it nevertheless reduces 
expected conventional generation needed to satisfy consumer electricity demand until the end of the phase.   
13 These are Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, Finland, France, Hungary, Netherlands, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden 
and UK.   
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where ( )ct tcΨ  is a function transforming conventional thermal power generation into 
emissions.  To compute the integral in (7) I would need to know the dispatch order for each 
day, as well as the marginal emission intensity of all generators involved, information which is 
not available.  Instead, I approximate the emission intensity of all generators that are not 
continuously running by a linear function.  This allows me to express (7) as 
(8) 
min min( )
c
t t
c
t
g k c
k g c
γ
γ
≈ + ⋅
≡ − ⋅
 
The parameter γ  represents the average emission intensity of fossil-fueled electricity 
generation beyond minimum consumption min( )ctc .  For the period under consideration I treat 
γ  as fixed.  The constant k captures the difference between CO2 emissions associated with 
minimum thermal generation 
 
gmin  and the (theoretical) emissions if the emission intensity γ  
were applicable to infra-marginal generation as well.14  Combining (6) and (8), emissions are a 
function of a set of parameters and the two stochastic exogenous processes tc  and th :   
(9) ( )t t tg k c h nγ η= + ⋅ − −  
At time t, the mean of future CO2 emissions is defined by  
(10) 
( )
1
1
[ ] ( )
( ) [ ] [ ]
T
T
t t t t k k
k t
T
t k t k
k t
E G E k c h n
T t k E c E h n
µ γ η
γ η
= +
= +
 
= = + ⋅ − − 
 
= − + ⋅ − −
∑
∑
 
                                                                
14 The average emission intensity of inframarginal conventional generation can be greater or smaller than the emission intensity 
of marginal generation. For example, if inframarginal generation stems largely from lignite or anthracite coal power plants, then 
k>0 because these generators have a greater emission intensity than the marginal conventional generators which are 
predominantly hard coal and gas generators.  On the other hand, if inframarginal generation contains a large share of combined 
cycle gas turbines (CCGTs), then k<0.  In the EU, k>0 is more likely given the significant fraction of lignite generation in 
Germany and the new EU member countries from Eastern Europe.   
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The variance (for a derivation see Appendix) is  
(11) 
 
st
2 = Vart[Gt
T ] = Vart[gk ]
k= t +1
T
∑ + 2 Covt[gk, gu]
u= k +1
T
∑
k= t +1
T
∑
= γ 2 Vart[ck ] − 2ηCovt[ck, hk ] + η
2Vart[hk ]( )
k= t +1
T
∑
+ 2γ 2 Covt[ck,cu] + η
2Covt[hk,hu] −ηCovt[ck,hu] −ηCovt[hk,cu]( )
u= k +1
T
∑
k= t +1
T
∑
 
Both expressions are functions of the constants n and η (which I treat as fixed), the 
parameters k and γ, and the mean, variance and covariance of electricity consumption and 
precipitation, the derivation of which is the subject of the next subsection.   
4.2.  Properties of the stochastic processes ct and ht  
For the analysis of the stochastic processes that describe electricity demand and 
precipitation, I will draw extensively from a paper by Alaton et al. (2002).  Although they focus 
on pricing a weather option over heating-degree days, their analysis can also be applied to 
electricity demand and precipitation because both are exogenously driven stochastic processes 
that contain deterministic annual fluctuation and long-term trends.  The contribution of my 
paper is not the derivation of the property of such processes, but the application of these 
methods to CO2 allowance pricing.   
I model both electricity consumption and precipitation as diffusion processes consisting 
of a deterministic mean and a stochastic part, and which exhibit mean-reversion.  For 
mathematical tractability, I include the stochastic element in the form of a generalized Wiener 
process.  Combining the processes in the index ,x c h= , they can be described as 
(12) ( )( ) ,
m
m x xt
t x t t i t t
dxdx a x x dt dW x c h
dt
σ
 
= + ⋅ − + = 
 
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This is known as an Ornstein-Uhlenbeck (OU) process with a non-zero mean mtx  that 
changes over time, and time-varying volatility.  The term in brackets represents the drift, 
followed by the diffusion term defined by the standard Wiener process xtdW  multiplied by the 
volatility.  The mean reversion parameter 
 
ax measures the speed at which the processes revert 
back to their long-term mean.  Lastly, the index ( )i t  labels the calendar month to which the 
time index t refers.  I constrain the volatility to be constant within each calendar month, but 
allow it to differ across months, such that ( ) (1,...,12)i t ∈ .  For example, if day t belongs to 
January of any year, then ( ) 1i t = .   
The standard form of the OU-process can be derived simply by setting / 0mtdx dt =  and 
( )
x x
i tσ σ=  (note that the volatility remains deterministic in spite of its time subscript).  At ts ≤ , 
the solution for the stochastic differential equations in (12) is  
(13) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) x x
t
a t s a tm m x x
t s s t i
s
x x x e x e dWτ τ τσ
− − − −= − ⋅ + + ∫  
The first term on the RHS is the deviation of actual consumption/precipitation at the 
present time s from its mean.  As time goes on, the impact of this deviation will diminish due to 
the mean-reversion property of both processes, measured by the exponent.  If one of the 
processes is at its average at time s, or if st >> , then the first term will drop out, and the 
expectation at time t simply becomes mtx .    
In my empirical approach, I specify the long-term mean of electricity consumption and 
precipitation at time t as  
(14) 0 1 2 sin[2 / 365 ]
m x x x x x
t tx t t D WDβ β β π ω= + ⋅ + ⋅ + + ⋅  
19 
 
The parameters x0β  and 
x
1β  describe the level and trend of the process x, respectively, 
whereas x2β  describes the amplitudes of the respective sine wave.  The phase angle 
xω  shifts 
the oscillation of the two processes to their correct position.  Lastly, the vector of coefficients 
xD  accounts for differences across different weekdays, with tWD  being a vector of weekday 
dummies (this only applies to electricity consumption, as there is no reason to believe that 
precipitation follows a particular weekday pattern).   
Using (13), we can compute the mean and variance of future electricity demand and 
precipitation.  The expectation of the level of the process at time t, taken on day s, depends on 
the deviation of the current level from its long-term mean, as well as the expected long-term at 
time t:  
(15) ( )[ ] [ ] xa t sm ms t s s tE x x x e x
− −= − ⋅ +  
Since the diffusion term in (12) is unaffected by the presence of a deterministic time-
varying mean, the variance is that of a regular OU-process and is derived by applying Itô’s 
integral of a deterministic integrand (for a general treatment, see Shreve (2004)):  
(16) ( )2 2 ( ) 2( )[ ] [ ] ( )x
t
a t y x
s t s t s t i y
s
Var x E x E x e dyσ− − = − =   ∫  
If the volatility does not change between s and time t, (16) can be solved for  
(17) ( )
2
( ) 2 ( )( )[ ] 1
2
x
x
i t a t s
s t
x
Var x e
a
σ −= −  
If the variance changes between s and t, the expression becomes more complicated.  I will 
denote the first day of each month as { }min min : ( )it t i t i= = .  I show in the Appendix that for 
hcx ,=  and )()( tisi ≤ , the general expression for the variance is  
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(18) 
min
1
( ) 1
2 ( ) 2 ( )2 2 2 2
1 ( ) ( )
( )
1[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
2
x k x
i t
a t t a t sx x x x
s t k k i t i s
k i sx
Var x e e
a
σ σ σ σ+
−
− − − −
+
=
 
 = − + −  
 
∑  
If the volatility is constant across different calendar months, (18) reduces to (17).   
Lastly, the covariance between electricity consumption and precipitation on days t and u 
for 
 
s ≤ t ≤ u is defined by (see Appendix):  
(19) 
( )
( )
( )
[ , ] [ ]
[ , ] [ , ]
[ , ] [ , ]
x
h
c
a u t
s t u s t
a u t
s t u s t t
a u t
s t u s t t
Cov x x e Var x
Cov c h e Cov c h
Cov h c e Cov c h
− −
− −
− −
= ⋅
= ⋅
= ⋅
 
There is no reason to believe that consumption of electricity and precipitation on the same 
day should be systematically related, and the data confirm this.  I therefore set [ , ]s t tCov c h =
[ , ]s t uCov c h = [ , ] 0s t uCov h c =  in eq. (11).  Expressions (15) and (18)-(19) can now be 
substituted into (10) and (11), which in turn have to be substituted into (5).   
 
5. Estimation 
Estimation proceeds in two steps: First, I estimate the parameters 0 1 2, , , ,
x x x xβ β β ω  ,c xD a  and 1 12,...,
x xσ σ , using 
data available through 2005, or through 2007 where necessary (see below).  Second, I estimate the remaining parameters in tµ  
and ts  in the allowance pricing formula (5) using data starting in 2006, treating the first-step estimates as given.    
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5.1.) Data 
Allowance prices:  Over-the-counter (OTC) closing allowance prices from Point Carbon.   
Electricity consumption:  Daily data about electricity consumption is available from the 
Union for the Coordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) for continental European 
countries, 15 including all EU member countries except for the Nordic countries, the UK, 
Ireland, the Baltic States, Malta and Cyprus.  Electricity consumption on the third Wednesday 
of each month is available starting in 1994 for 9 EU countries, in 1996 for Germany, and in 
1999 for another 5 countries.  Consumption on the weekend following the third Wednesday of 
each month is available for the year 2000 only.  Starting in 2006, electricity consumption is 
available on a daily basis for all UCTE countries.  To supplement the UCTE data I obtained 
historic electricity consumption data from the transmission system operators (TSOs) in the UK, 
Ireland and the Nordic countries.16  I exclude Malta, Cyprus and the Baltic States due to lack of 
data.  The 20 countries included in the analysis account for 99% of total production in the EU-
25.  The EU produces nearly all of the electricity it consumes, with net imports/exports 
accounting for less than 0.1 percent of overall consumption.  I therefore set EU consumption 
equal to EU generation.  In order to accommodate the variation in type and provenance of the 
data I will carry out the analyses separately for each group of countries for which the available 
data is of the same type and covers the same time period.  The six groups are listed in Table 2, 
and Figures 3a-f show the available pre-2006 electricity consumption data by group.   
  
                                                                
15 Available at http://www.entsoe.eu/, last accessed in September 2008.   
16 UK: Daily data since 2001 from the National grid, available at http://www.nationalgrid.com/uk/Electricity/Data/;  Ireland: 
Daily data since 2002 from Eirgrid, available at http://www.eirgrid.com; Denmark: Daily data since 2000 from Energinet, 
available at http://www.energinet.dk; Finland: Daily data since 2004 from Fingrid, available at http://www.fingrid.fi; Sweden: 
Daily data since 2000 from Svenska Kraftnät, available at http://www.svk.se/web/Page.aspx?id=5794.    
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Table 2: Data availability (pre-2006) and installed hydroelectric capacity by country 
Countries Start of data series Hydro capacity 
  Type Year Sourcea in 2006 (MW) 
Group 1 
       Austria 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 11'811 
   Belgium 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 1'411 
   France 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 25'457 
   Greece 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 3'133 
   Italy 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 21'070 
   Luxembourg 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 1'128 
   Netherlands 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 37 
   Portugal 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 4'948 
   Spain 3rd Wed. 1994 UCTE 20'714 
Group 2 
       Germany 3rd Wed. 1996 UCTE 9'100 
Group 3 
       Czech Republic 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 2'175 
   Hungary 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 46 
   Poland 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 2'324 
   Slovak Republic 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 2'429 
   Slovenia 3rd Wed. 1999 UCTE 873 
Group 4 
       UK daily 2002 Country TSO 4'256 
   Ireland daily 2002 Country TSO 512 
Group 5 
       Denmark daily 2000 Country TSO 10 
   Sweden daily 2000 Country TSO 16'180 
Group 6 
       Finland daily 2004 Country TSO 3'044 
a:UCTE: Union for the Coordination of transmission of electricity; TSO: Transmission system operator 
 
Precipitation:  Data from the European Climate Assessment and Dataset,17 which 
contains daily entries for 1,048 monitoring stations located in 42 countries.  The period of 
observation varies from a few years to >150 years, with most series spanning several decades.  
To model the stochastic process underlying precipitation, I use data covering the years 1976-
2005.  The conversion of precipitation into hydroelectric power is location-specific.  For 
example, rainfall in the Netherlands or in Denmark is largely irrelevant because these countries 
have very little installed hydroelectric generation capacity, whereas hydro generation 
constitutes a large share of total power production in Alpine and Scandinavian countries.  I 
                                                                
17 Klein Tank et al. (2007): “Daily Dataset of 20th-Century Surface Air Temperature and Precipitation Series for the European 
Climate Assessment”, available at eca.knmi.nl, last accessed in September 2008.   
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average station entries by country,18 and then create a weighted European average using 
installed hydroelectric capacity in 2006 as weights.19  Installed hydro generation is given in the 
last column of Table 2.  Weighted precipitation in millimeters (mm) is shown in Figure 4 for a 
subset of the sample period.  Whereas it is difficult to visually discern a pattern in the raw data 
(Fig. 4a), using moving 7-day-average (Fig. 4b) reveals a clear seasonality.   
 
  
                                                                
18 For relatively flat countries such as Belgium and Luxembourg, I simply take an average of all monitoring stations.  However, 
since hydro generation in the Alps and in Scandinavia is highly location-specific, I take an average of the subset of monitoring 
stations that are located in or near mountains.  A full list of the selected stations is available from the author upon request.   
19 This data comes from UCTE (www.ucte.org) for continental Europe; from Nordpool (www.nordel.org) for Scandinavia; 
from the Austrian Energy Agency (www.energyagency.at/enercee/) for the Baltic States; from Harrison (2005) for the UK; and 
from the Electricity Supply Board (ESB, available at http://www.esb.ie/main/about_esb/power_stations_intro.jsp) for Ireland; 
all accessed in September 2008.   
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Figure 3: Available daily electricity consumption, pre-2006 
 
         3a: Group 1 (AU, BE, FR, GR, IT, LU, NL, PT and ES)   3b: Group 2 (Germany) 
 
 
      3c: Group 3 (CZ, HU, PL, SK and SK)   3d: Group 4 (UK and Ireland) 
 
 
     3e: Group 5 (Sweden and Denmark)          3f:  Group 6 (Finland) 
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Figure 4: Weighted average precipitation in the EU 
 
     4a: Daily precipitation      4b: Weekly moving averages 
 
5.2  Parameter estimation for electricity consumption and precipitation 
Using data through 2005, I estimate the parameters 0 1 2, , , , ,
x x x x x xD aβ β β ω  and 
1 12,...,
x xσ σ  with a model that features an autoregressive error to account for mean-reversion and 
multiplicative heteroskedasticity to allow the variance to differ across months:  
(20) ( )
0 1 1 2
1
2
( )
2 1 2 6
( ) 0 1 11
sin(2 / 365) cos(2 / 365)
~ 0, ( )
( ) exp{ ... } ; , , ..., ,
x x x x x x
t t t
x x x x
t t t
x x
t i t
x x x x
i t t t
x t t t D WD
u
u N
Jan Nov x c c c h
β β α π α π ε
ε ϕ ε
ξ
ξ λ λ λ
−
= + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ + ⋅ +
= ⋅ +
= + ⋅ + + ⋅ =
 
The index x covers six different electricity consumption series, plus the precipitation 
series, for which I carry out separate regressions.  The parameters xx 10 , ββ  and 
xD  are the same 
as in (14) and are estimated directly by maximum likelihood.  The transformation of the sine 
wave plus the phase angle into a sine and cosine wave is a standard trigonometric relation and 
serves to linearize the equation.  The parameters x2β  and 
xω  can be computed using the 
estimates of x1α  and 
x
2α :20  
                                                                
20 See, for example, Beckwith et al. (1995), p. 131.  The t-statistics have to be computed using the delta method.   
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(21) 
2 2
2 1 2
2 1
( ) ( )
arctan[ / ]
x x x
x x x
β α α
ω α α
= +
=
;  hcccx ,...,,, 621=  
For a stationary autoregressive process with one time lag, the variance is given by21  
(22) ( )
2
2 ( )2 2
( )
( )
( ) [ ] [ ]
1
x
i tx
i t t t t
x
E x E x E
ξ
σ ε
ϕ
 = − = =  −
 
The mean-reversion parameter xa  measures the speed at which a shock to tx  is felt at 
later times.  From (15), the expectation of future electricity consumption or precipitation is  
 
( )
( )
[ ] [ ] x
x
a t sm m
s t s s t
a t sx m
s t
E x x x e x
e xε
− −
− −
= − +
= ⋅ +
 
The term )( staxe −−  is equivalent to the impulse-response function of the AR(1) process 
defined by ( , ) t st sχ ϕ −=  (see e.g. Hamilton (1994) p. 53-54), which measures the impact of 
an exogenous shock occurring in period s on the variable in period t.  Equating the two and 
solving yields  
(23) ln( )x xa ϕ= −  
I derived the expressions for the mean, variance and covariance in (15), (18) and (19) for 
aggregate electricity consumption.  Having six data groups requires the following adjustment:  
(15’) 
6
1
[ ] [ ]js t s t
j
E c E c
=
= ∑  
                                                                
21 Because Series 1-3 only contain data for every 3rd Wednesday and some weekends, and because the estimate for ξix improves 
with greater frequency (Hayashi and Yoshida, 2005), I use the 2006-7 data to estimate ϕx and ξix for Series 1-3.  I also use 
2006-7 data to estimate the correlation coefficients.  For all other first-step parameters, I use pre-2006 data only.  The variance 
and mean reversion estimates from Series 4-6 (for which such a comparison can be made) are not significantly different 
between pre- and post-2006 data.   
27 
 
(18’) 
6 6 6
1 1 1
[ ] [ ] 2 [ , ]j j ls t s t s t t
j j l j
Var c Var c Cov c c
= = = +
= +∑ ∑ ∑  
(19’) ( )
6 6 6*( ) *( ) *( )
1 1 1
[ , ] * [ ] [ , ]j j lc c ca u t a u t a u tj j ls t u s t s t t
j j l j
Cov c c e Var c e e Cov c c− − − − − −
= = = +
= + +∑ ∑ ∑  
with the covariance across the individual time series given by  
                 ( ) min1
( ) 1
( )( ) ( )( )
1 1 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
( )
[ , ]
j l j l j l j lj l k j lc c c c
j l
j l i t
a a t t a a t sj l c c c c c c c c
s t t k k k k i t i t i s i s
k i sc c
Cov c c e e
a a
ρ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ σ+
−
− + − − + −
+ +
=
 
= − + − 
+  
∑
 
Table 3 shows the first-stage parameter estimates.  The correlation coefficients in Table 4 
imply that electricity consumption across the six different regions is highly correlated.  Based 
on these estimates I compute the mean, variance and covariance terms in eqs. (10-11).   
5.3  Parameter estimation in the options formula 
I now turn to estimating the remaining parameters in the options pricing formula.  
Because emissions were below the total cap for the first phase as a whole as well as for each 
year individually, I disregard the second line of eq. (5). Substituting (10) and (11) into (5) while 
using (8) and simplifying gives   
(25) 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
0( )
1 1
1/2
2 2
1 1 1
40
[ ] [ ]
[ ] [ ] 2 [ , ] [ , ]
tr T t II
t t
t
T t
t t k t k k k
k t k
T T T
t t k t k t k u t k u
k t k t u k
A S Tk
P e P
B
with
A E c E h n c h n
B Var c Var h Cov c c Cov h h
γ
γ
η η
η η
− −
= + =
= + = + = +
 − −
= + ⋅Φ   
 
≡ − − + − −
 
≡ + + + 
 
∑ ∑
∑ ∑ ∑
 
At is the sum of past and expected future consumption of conventional electricity, 
whereas Bt is the standard deviation of future conventional generation.  Conditional on the first-
stage parameter estimates, At and Bt can be treated as exogenous daily data.    
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Table 3: Parameter estimates for diffusion processes 
  c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 h 
        
N 168 144 108 1,460 2,190 730 10,950 
β0 1486.06 1248.56 654.25 763.47 569.68 207.54 23.45 
   z 22.73 36.44 17.47 16.92 25.12 1.95 44.10 
β1 86.98 5.33 4.84 9.06 -2.07 1.20 -0.01 
   z 32.44 3.92 3.42 5.57 -2.44 0.33 -0.28 
Mo n/a n/a n/a -20.84 -3.51 0.66 n/a 
   z n/a n/a n/a -22.31 -5.98 1.60 n/a 
Fr n/a n/a n/a -20.31 -13.98 1.01 n/a 
   z n/a n/a n/a -20.31 -22.31 2.31 n/a 
Sa -416.47 -207.72 -72.13 -128.22 -67.15 -15.71 n/a 
   z 32.44 3.92 3.42 -101.66 -97.18 -28.56 n/a 
Su -750.21 -328.49 -128.43 -157.64 -72.43 -21.45 n/a 
   z -13.80 -26.70 -12.23 -133.32 -103.87 -43.08 n/a 
XNY n/a n/a n/a -86.72 -37.25 -11.54 n/a 
   z n/a n/a n/a -20.08 -12.89 -4.85 n/a 
β2 375.85 145.36 116.96 134.10 104.99 36.98 3.00 
   z 18.99 25.19 32.22 35.09 41.12 10.91 7.06 
ω 1.33 1.39 1.41 1.23 1.34 1.35 -0.40 
   z 42.06 49.94 46.71 38.54 47.09 14.26 -2.96 
         
ϕ* 0.58 0.39 0.59 0.84 0.86 0.91 0.52 
   z 18.95 11.32 21.52 95.98 87.02 74.92 103.92 
a* 0.54 0.94 0.53 0.18 0.15 0.09 0.65 
   z 10.24 10.68 11.38 17.15 13.20 6.94 68.02 
        
σi*       
Jan  499.71 133.17 88.72 65.21 46.42 23.69 17.21 
Feb 316.67 94.92 53.10 45.35 42.27 23.84 16.15 
Mar 366.30 119.39 64.96 67.47 41.32 21.19 19.15 
Apr 453.41 142.96 79.08 79.32 51.52 31.36 14.49 
May 400.48 135.97 55.56 92.75 48.67 33.66 16.28 
Jun 387.02 132.80 59.94 45.64 46.51 34.84 16.54 
Jul 427.82 116.79 55.50 20.17 30.71 12.12 18.07 
Aug 305.51 97.78 50.71 69.65 12.10 7.77 20.91 
Sep 389.43 122.02 61.45 23.50 18.56 7.65 20.21 
Oct 387.15 120.30 64.95 31.66 27.65 11.17 22.63 
Nov 432.38 108.56 73.35 39.00 35.50 19.57 21.50 
Dec 414.69 163.85 85.40 96.82 55.91 42.84 17.68 
*For series 1-3, based on 2006-7 data; all other estimates based on pre-2006 data 
 
Table 4: Correlation coefficients among different series (2006-7 data) 
  c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 h 
c1 1.000       
c2 0.8814* 1.000      
c3 0.9016* 0.8730* 1.000     
c4 0.4554* 0.2976* 0.4927* 1.000    
c5 0.5170* 0.3897* 0.6032* 0.9231* 1.000   
c6 0.4588* 0.3672* 0.5573* 0.8496* 0.9418* 1.000  
h -0.067 0.014 -0.036 -0.038 -0.033 -0.020 1.000 
*p<0.05    
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Before proceeding to estimation I need to make two empirical adjustments to (25):  First, 
because my data only covers 2006-2007 emissions and only from the power sector, I include a 
parameter 
 
V  representing 2005 emissions as well as emissions from all other sectors (in all 
years).  Firms have expectations about this parameter, and it is evident from the April 2006 
price crash that these expectations were updated after the first round of emissions verifications.  
As a second adjustment I therefore include an adjustment factor 
 
V EV  multiplied by a dummy 
variable 
 
Dt
EV  taking the value of zero before, and of one after the first round of emissions 
verifications.  This leads to the following regression specification:  
(26) ( )
( ) 2
2
30
40 ~ (0, )
EV EV
r T t II t t
t t t t
t
A K D VP e P N
B
K S V Tk
ε
γ
ε ε σ
γ
− −  − + ⋅= + ⋅Φ + 
 
≡ − − ⋅
 
The parameter K represents the number of allowances available to firms in the power 
sector in the years 2006-7:  This number is the total cap 0S  minus emissions in 2005 and from 
other sectors in all years (V ), plus an adjustment for the difference between infra-marginal and 
marginal emission intensity ( 2 3 Tk ).22  I use an interest rate r of 10% per annum (using zero and 
20% did not significantly alter the results) and estimate eq. (26) by nonlinear least squares.   
As an extension I allow the standard deviation of expected future electricity consumption 
to differ from tB , and further I consider the (very likely) possibility that firms updated this 
standard deviation after the permit price crash:  
(27) ( ) ( )
( )40 *
EV EV
r T t II t t
t t EV EV
t t
A K D VP e P
B D
γ
γ θ θ
− −
 − + ⋅ = + Φ
 ⋅ + ⋅ 
 
                                                                
22 If the emission intensity of inframarginal generation were the same as that of marginal generation, then K=0 and this 
adjustment drops out.  The factor 2/3 generation stems from the fact that V already contains total emissions for 2005.   
30 
 
Setting θ=1 and θEV=0 reduces (27) to (26).   
An additional empirical problem is that the parameters K , tγ  and 
EVV  are not 
individually identified.  I therefore compute estimates for tγ  and 
EVV  conditional on K .  
Naturally, one could just as well condition on tγ  or 
EVV , but I argue that I have a somewhat 
better idea about K  than about tγ  or 
EVV .  I choose a sensible range for K  based on the 
following calculation:   
The total cap 0S  is 6,300 Mt (million tons) CO2, or 2,100 Mt per year (see Table 1), 
which I will use for expected 2005 emissions (emissions were in fact below the cap in 2005, but 
this was not known until the permit price crash in April 2006; in fact, this was the reason for the 
crash).  Third-party power and CPH producers23 emit about 1,175 Mt per year, leaving 925 Mt 
for all other industrial emitters in the years 2006-7 (IEA data).  If firms’ expectations 
approximately reflect these numbers, then 2,100 Mt 2*925 3,950 MtV ≈ + = .   
To get an approximate estimate for Tk, I assume that lignite plants run continuously and 
are never at the margin, whereas marginal generation consists of a mix of gas and hard coal 
generation.  The emission intensity of lignite exceeds the (weighted average) emission intensity 
of coal and gas generation by about is about 225 tCO2/GWh, and electric output from lignite is 
about 290,000 GWh per year (IEA data).  This means that 2/3∙Tk ≈ 2∙225 t/GWh∙290,000 GWh 
=130.5 Mt, which in turn implies that K ≈ 2,220 Mt.  I use a range of 1,800 Mt ≤ K ≤ 2,600 Mt 
to account for the uncertainty embedded in this calculation.   
The left panel in Table 5 shows the results from estimating (26) for different values of K .  
The parameter EVV  can be interpreted as the market participants’ updating of the number of 
permits that are available to cover emissions in the power sector.  The range of 81-116 Mt 
                                                                
23 These are generators that sell their output on the market.  I assume that combined power and heat (CPH) producers optimize 
their power output and treat heat production as a byproduct.   
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makes sense in the context of a market that was initially viewed to have a very stringent cap, 
but then turned out to have an allowance surplus of 89 Mt.24  The range of the emission 
intensity γ  of 607-876 tCO2/GWh is also plausible, considering that the emission intensity of 
gas and coal generators is about 420 and 960 t CO2/GWh, respectively, and that coal generators 
are in the majority in Europe.  All estimates are statistically significant at p<0.001.   
Table 5: Parameter estimates from estimating model 1 (eq. (26)) and 2 (eq. (27); N=513 
  Model 1 
 
Model 2 
K γ VEV 
 
γ VEV θ−1 θEV 
(Mt) (tCO2/GWh) (Mt) 
 
(tCO2/GWh) (Mt) 
  
        1'800 606.6 -80.6 
 
606.0 -7.8 
  1'900 640.3 -85.0 
 
639.7 -8.3 
 2'000 673.9 -89.5 
 
673.3 -8.8 
  2'100 707.6 -94.0 
 
707.0 -9.2 
  2'200 741.3 -98.5 
 
740.7 -9.7 0.17 -0.89 
2'300 775.0 -103.0 
 
774.3 -10.1 (all K) 
2'400 808.7 -107.0 
 
808.0 -10.5 
  2'500 842.4 -112.0 
 
841.7 -11.0 
  2'600 876.1 -116.0 
 
875.3 -11.4 
     t-value 983.34 -34.83 
 
463.63 -2.00 0.45 -2.40 
   p-value <0.001 <0.001 
 
<0.001 0.046 0.653 0.017 
Adj. R2 0.9581 
 
0.9854 
Cox-Snell R2 vs. Null-model 0.8140 
 
0.9450 
   model 2 vs. 1 
  
0.6519 
 
The adjusted R2 is very high, but due to the presence of the dummy variable this may not 
be a very meaningful measure.  As an additional measure of model fit I employ the Cox-Snell 
generalized R2, defined by 2 2/1 [ (0) / ( )] NC SR L L β− = − , where ( )L β  and (0)L  refer to the 
likelihood of the full model and of a model that contains only a constant and an emission 
verification dummy, respectively, and N is the number of observations.  The measure 2C SR −  has 
an intuitive interpretation: It represents the proportion of the variation of the dependent variable 
                                                                
24 The negative sign is due to the fact that the number of permits available to the power sector is the total number of permits in 
the market, minus what has been used up already, represented by V.  A negative adjustment of V implies that more permits are 
available for the power sector; a positive coefficient would imply the opposite.   
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that is unexplained by the null model (Nagelkerke, 1991).  Thus, Model 1 accounts for 81 % of 
the allowance price variation that is unexplained by a model that only relies on pre- and post-
crash intercepts.   
The right panel of Table 5 contains the estimates from specification (27), which I call 
model 2.  The implied emission intensity γ  is about the same as in model 1, and the parameter 
estimate of 1.17θ =  is not significantly larger than unity, implying that Bt correctly reflects 
market participants’ pre-crash estimate of the standard deviation of expected future 
conventional electricity consumption.  However, the value of 0.89EVθ = −  implies that market 
participants drastically reduced their assessment of this standard deviation after the first round 
of emissions verification to about a quarter of Bt, coupled with a relatively small adjustment of 
their expectation of outstanding permits.  The model fit as measured by the 2C SR −  increases to 
95%.  Relative to model 1, the introduction of the two additional parameters in model 2 
accounts for 65 % of the remaining unexplained variation.   
Since Bt is an unbiased estimate of the standard deviation, a possible interpretation of the 
results of model (27) is that the new information that became available in April 2006 led market 
participants to under-estimate the uncertainty associated with future emissions.  Naturally, such 
an interpretation is conditional on the model being correct, and on market participants having 
access to the same information as presented in this study.   
Figure 5 shows the predicted price series computed using the estimates from the two 
specifications, along with the actual allowance price.  Both predictions track the price 
reasonably well, although the more flexible second specification follows the EUA much closer.  
Importantly, both models are able to explain a stabilization of the EUA price at a level 
significantly above zero after the price crash.  This is because although the cap was seen to be 
generous after the first round of emissions verifications, there remained a nonzero probability 
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of higher-than-expected emissions in the future and therefore a chance that the cap would turn 
out to be binding in spite of the low 2005 emissions.   
Figure 5: EUA price and predictions from estimating (27) and (28) 
 
 
6. Conclusions 
In this paper I derive an expression for the allowance price during phase 1 based on the 
assumption that emissions are stochastic and firms are unable to abate.  In this case, the value 
of an allowance is characterized by a pricing formula for a binary option that contains the 
penalty of noncompliance multiplied by the probability of a binding cap.   
I estimate the model using data about daily electricity consumption and precipitation.  
The parameter estimates of the options pricing formula are highly significant and make 
economic sense.  The predicted allowance price series fits the observed prices well, especially 
when accounting for uncertainty embedded in emissions from other sectors and allowing firms’ 
expectation of uncertainty to be updated after the first round of emissions verifications.  The 
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results imply that firms were hedging against the possibility of having to pay a penalty, and that 
uncertainty about future emissions may be a key allowance price driver.   
Importantly, the model is able to explain the price stabilization after the price crash, 
followed by a long and steady decline towards zero, which is due to a declining (but nonzero) 
probability that the cap would unexpectedly turn out to be binding due to a late surge in 
emissions.  Models based on the equality of allowance price and marginal abatement costs 
would only be able to explain such a movement if marginal abatement costs also expressed a 
steady decline towards the end of the market, a scenario for which there is no evidence in the 
empirical literature.  This may be the reason for the generally poor performance of such models 
in explaining price drivers in the EU ETS.   
Naturally, my results are contingent on the assumption of no abatement, which allowed 
me to derive a closed-form solution for the permit price and thus apply the pricing formula to 
market data.  My model has to be understood as a polar case, whereas in reality some 
abatement probably did occur, especially while the allowance price remained high.  If firms 
were partially able to control their emissions, the allowance price would presumably still 
exhibit some options features but at the same time incorporate drivers related to marginal 
abatement costs, in keeping with results reported by Carmona et al (2009).   
The accumulated evidence from empirical studies suggests that abatement was not the 
predominant price driver during the first phase of the EU ETS.  Furthermore, considering that 
first-phase emissions were used to determine second-phase allocation, it is entirely possible that 
firms did not want to abate emissions, even if they were able to do so, which empirically 
amounts to the same thing.  In this sense, the assumption of no abatement may not be 
unrealistic.   
Equality between permit price and marginal abatement costs is a prerequisite for 
efficiency in any permit market, and in this sense once would conclude that phase 1 of the EU 
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ETS was not efficient.  However, another goal of the first phase that was probably more 
important than efficiency was to prepare the market for the Kyoto period.  Considering that the 
EUA price exhibits much less volatility in the current (second) phase, the first phase may have 
fulfilled its role as a pilot phase.  Whether marginal abatement costs indeed drive the permit 
price in the current phase is, however, an open question that requires further research.   
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Appendix 
Result 1:  Variance of future emissions 
The variance of TtG  is defined by  
(A1) 2
1 1 1
[ ] [ ] 2 [ , ]
T T T
T
t s t s k s k u
k t k t u k
s Var G Var g Cov g g
= + = + = +
= = +∑ ∑ ∑  
At time s , the variance tg  and the covariance between tg  and ug  for s t u< <  are  
(A2) 
( )
1
2
1
2 2
1
[ ]
[ ] 2 [ , ] [ ]
c
s t s t
c
s t
s t s t t s t
Var g Var K c
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γ
γ
γ η η
 = + 
 =  
= − +
 
(A3)               
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Combining (A2) and (A3) establishes the result in equation (11) 
(11) 
( )
( )
2 2 2
1
2 2
1 1
[ ] [ ]
2 [ , ] [ , ] [ , ] [ , ]
T
t s t s t
k t
T T
s t u s t u s t u s t u
k t u k
s Var c Var h
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γ η
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= +
+ + − −
∑
∑ ∑
 
 
Result 2:  Generalization of the variance for different volatilities  
Restating equation (16), the variance of tc  and th  for ts ≤≤0  is  
(16) 2 ( ) 2( )[ ] ( ) ,x
t
a t x
s t i y
s
Var x e dy x c hτ σ− −= =∫  
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Suppose that at time s, we’re in month 5 and want to calculate the variance of 
consumption/precipitation in month 8. Using the notation defined in the text that 
{ }min( ) min : ( )i tt t i t i= = , with ( ) (1,...,12)i t ∈  we have that min min min min6 7 8 9s t t t t t< < < < < .  I now 
split up the integral in (17) into four integrals with constant volatility:  
(A4)               
min min min
6 7 8
min min min
6 7 8
2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( ) 2 ( )2 2 2 2
5 6 7 8[ ] ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )x x x x
t t t t
a t y a t y a t y a t yx x x x
s t
s t t t
Var x e dy e dy e dy e dyσ σ σ σ− − − − − − − −= + + +∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
Next, I split the exponents such that they match with the new upper limits of the integrals and 
move the remainder (a constant) in front:  
(A5) 
min min
6 7
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8 8
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Because the volatilities are constant within each integral, each of them can be solved to  
 
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
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Multiplying out and some rearranging gives 
(A6) ( ) ( )
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which can be generalized to  
(19) ( ) min( 1)
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Result 3:  Covariance of x on two different days  
The covariance between tx  and ux , for hcx ,=  and uts ≤≤  is given by 
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I split up the second integral into two parts and pull out the constant term:  
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Multiplying out gives 
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The second term is the expectation of the product of two stochastic processes occurring during 
non-overlapping time periods.  Because a Wiener process is i.i.d., this term drops out.  Using 
the fact that dtdW =2)(  establishes the result:  
(20) 
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